Political limits on the world oil trade : firm-level evidence from US firms by Kashcheeva Mila
Political limits on the world oil trade :
firm-level evidence from US firms
著者 Kashcheeva Mila
権利 Copyrights 日本貿易振興機構（ジェトロ）アジア
経済研究所 / Institute of Developing
Economies, Japan External Trade Organization
(IDE-JETRO) http://www.ide.go.jp
journal or
publication title
IDE Discussion Paper
volume 401
year 2013-03-01
URL http://hdl.handle.net/2344/1223
INSTITUTE OF DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 
  
IDE Discussion Papers are preliminary materials circulated  
to stimulate discussions and critical comments 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Oil imports, Political distance, FDI 
JEL classification: F14, F51, Q34 
  
* Research Fellow, Inter-disciplinary Studies Center, Institute of Developing Economies, 
Japan External Trade Organization, Japan 
IDE DISCUSSION PAPER No. 401 
 
Political limits on the World Oil 
Trade: Firm-level evidence from US 
firms 
 
Mila Kashcheeva* 
March 2013 
Abstract  
International politics affect trade patterns, especially for firms in extractive industries. 
We construct the firm-level dataset for the U.S. oil-importing companies over 
1986-2010 to test whether the state of international relations with the trading partners 
of the U.S. affect importing behavior of the U.S. firms. To measure “political distance” 
between the U.S. and her trading partners we use voting records for the UN General 
Assembly. We find that the U.S. firms, in fact, import significantly less oil from the 
political opponents of the U.S. Our conjecture is that the decrease in oil imports is 
mainly driven by large, vertically-integrated U.S. firms that engage in foreign direct 
investment (FDI) overseas.  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Institute of Developing Economies (IDE) is a semigovernmental, 
nonpartisan, nonprofit research institute, founded in 1958. The Institute 
merged with the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) on July 1, 1998.  
The Institute conducts basic and comprehensive studies on economic and 
related affairs in all developing countries and regions, including Asia, the 
Middle East, Africa, Latin America, Oceania, and Eastern Europe. 
 
 
The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s).  Publication does 
not imply endorsement by the Institute of Developing Economies of any of the views 
expressed within. 
 
INSTITUTE OF DEVELOPING ECONOMIES (IDE), JETRO 
3-2-2, WAKABA, MIHAMA-KU, CHIBA-SHI 
CHIBA 261-8545, JAPAN 
 
©2013 by Institute of Developing Economies, JETRO 
No part of this publication may be reproduced without the prior permission of the 
IDE-JETRO. 
1 
 
Political limits on the World Oil Trade:  
Firm-level Evidence from US firms 
 
Mila Kashcheeva 
Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization, Japan 
 
Abstract: 
International politics affect trade patterns, especially for firms in extractive industries. We 
construct the firm-level dataset for the U.S. oil-importing companies over 1986-2010 to test 
whether the state of international relations with the trading partners of the U.S. affect 
importing behavior of the U.S. firms. To measure “political distance” between the U.S. and 
her trading partners we use voting records for the UN General Assembly. We find that the 
U.S. firms, in fact, import significantly less oil from the political opponents of the U.S. Our 
conjecture is that the decrease in oil imports is mainly driven by large, vertically-integrated 
U.S. firms that engage in foreign direct investment (FDI) overseas.  
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1. Introduction  
There is evidence that international politics affects trade patterns, especially for 
firms in extractive industries. In recent studies Mityakov et al. (2011, 2012) use 
disaggregated import flows at a sectoral level into the United States and find that the US 
imports significantly less crude oil from its political opponents, even after controlling for 
wars, sanctions, and tariffs.
1
 Given that the crude oil trade is often associated with 
backward vertical FDI, oil-firms face hold-up and expropriation risks, which likely rise 
when the political relationship between the US and its trading partner worsens, thus 
affecting the final oil imports. At the same time oil is a strategic commodity, imports of 
which are not only driven by profit-maximizing motives, but also by strategic and 
security consideration of the governments.  The authors confirm that both economic and 
political forces explain the finding that the US imports less oil from its political 
opponents.   
In this paper I use firm-level oil imports by the companies that operated in the US 
during the period 1986-2010 to further test if: (i) US firms import significantly less oil 
from the political opponents of the US government; (ii) large, vertically integrated US oil 
firms are the most sensitive to changes in political relationships between the US 
government and oil exporting states; (iii) the effect is more pronounced for the subsample 
of countries that have a history of nationalizations in the oil sector; and (iv) the effect is 
                                                          
1
 Mityakov et al. (2012) find that among 10 aggregate categories of US imports, - namely: petroleum, raw 
materials, forest products, tropical agriculture, animal products, cereals, etc., labor intensive, capital 
intensive, machinery, and chemicals, - only crude oil and some chemical products are affected by 
international politics.  
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more pronounced during the cold war period and the period after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. 
To measure the degree of political misalignment between the US and oil exporting 
countries I use the voting records from the United Nations General Assembly, similarly 
to Dreher and Strum (2012). 
I confirm the finding of Mityakov et al. (2011, 2012) that US firms import 
significantly less oil from the political opponents of the United States. In the preferred 
Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) specification with fixed effects and oil 
reserves as a control variable I find that a one standard deviation reduction in political 
distance increases US oil imports by more than 13 percent. I also find that the negative 
effect of political distance on oil imports by US firms is more pronounced for the cold-
war period and the period post the 9/11 terrorist attacks, suggesting that US oil-firms 
diversified their sources of oil supply away from the political opponents of the US most 
actively during these two periods.  
Without data on foreign direct investment (FDI) for the US companies in our 
sample I opt for another approach to test the hold-up risk hypothesis proposed by 
Mityakov et al. (2012). In particular, I divide the US firms in our sample by their size, 
assuming that large firms in the sample engage more often in FDI than small firms. I use 
two different methods to divide the firms in our sample: (i) based on the mean value of 
firms’ annual imports in the 1986-2012 period, and (ii) based on the mean value of firms’ 
total oil imports throughout the whole period. Our results suggest that the large firms in 
our sample appear to drive the baseline finding that US firms import less from the 
countries politically more distant from the US. The negative effect of political distance on 
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oil imports by US firms is larger and more significant for the subsample of large firms, 
identified either way, while this effect is not observable for the subsample of small firms.  
This relationship determines potential economic costs of hold-up.  
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the data, section 3  
presents the results of our analysis, and section 4 offers concluding remarks.  
 
2. Data 
I use the following sources of data for our analysis. Firm-level oil imports by 
companies that operate in the US are sourced from the US Energy Information 
Administration (EIA). The EIA original dataset is a monthly time-series for the period of 
1986-2010, and it includes information on firms’ imports of petroleum and other liquids 
in thousands of barrels. I use monthly EIA data to construct annual time-series of crude 
oil imports, and I use this in panel regressions as a dependent variable with control 
variables which also have annual frequency.  
Data on the Political Distance between the US and oil exporting countries in our 
dataset are sourced from Dreher and Strum (2012). The authors have used voting data 
from the United Nations General Assembly to construct several indexes which measure 
the degree of political alignment between different states. These indexes vary in the way 
in which they weight abstentions and absences in the voting procedures - in particular, 
the weights can be 0, 0.5 or 1. I follow the logic of Dreher and Strum (2012) in not 
choosing the corner solutions and favor the index constructed according to the definition 
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by Thacker (1999), where the votes in agreement with the United States are coded as 1, 
votes in disagreement as 0, and abstentions and absences as 0.5. The index lies between 0 
and 1, where a higher value reflects closer political interests of the US and the other 
country. In our regressions I use a political distance variable which equals 1 minus the 
original index, such that a higher value for the variable represents more politically distant 
governments.  
I also use annual oil reserves and oil production data for the period 1980-2011 
from the EIA as control variables in our regressions. Crude oil proven reserves are 
measured in billions of barrels, and production of crude oil including lease condensate is 
measured in thousands of barrels per day. While our preferred control variable is oil 
reserves as it is less subject to the endogeneity problem than the oil production variable, 
as a robustness check I use oil production as well. I also use such traditional controls for a 
gravity model as GDP and population, taken from the Penn World Tables, version 7.0.  
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the regressions. 
The base dataset has 6,322 observations and includes oil imports by US firms from 59 
oil-exporting countries. During 1986-2010, there are 156 oil-importing firms operating in 
the US with on average 60 firms co-existing within the same year. For the list of oil 
exporting countries in our sample please see Section I of the Appendix B.
2
   
                                                          
2 The G7 countries are not included in our final dataset because the data on political distance do not cover 
the G7 countries.  
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The variation in the quantity of oil imports is significant: the maximum annual oil 
import quantity is 197,479 thousand barrels, imported by “Motiva Enterprises LLC”3 
from Saudi Arabia in 2001, while at the same time there are about 20 zero observations in 
our baseline dataset. Political distance also has substantial variation and ranges from 
0.420 between the US and Australia in 2005 to 0.956 between the US and Algeria in 
2007.  
 
3. Empirical Analysis 
The purpose of the empirical analysis is to test if (i) US firms import significantly 
less oil from the political opponents of the United States; (ii) large, vertically integrated 
US oil firms are the most sensitive to changes in political relationships between the US 
and oil exporting states; (iii) the effect is more pronounced for the subsample of countries 
that have a history of nationalizations in the oil sector; (iv) the effect is more pronounced 
during the cold war period as well as the period after the 9/11 terrorist attack. 
 I do not have data on the life spans of the US companies in our dataset and this 
information is important if I want to properly account for years with zero oil imports for 
the firms that exist but choose not to import, or import only in certain years from chosen 
countries. Instead, I construct three additional datasets using different assumptions about 
the life spans of the firms in our baseline dataset. While no dataset by itself resolves the 
                                                          
3
 “Motiva Enterprises, LLC”, is a 50–50 joint venture between “Shell Oil Company” (the wholly owned 
American subsidiary of Royal Dutch Shell) and “Saudi Refining” (controlled by Saudi Aramco). Formed in 
1998, Motiva Enterprises LLC operates primarily in the eastern and southern United States. For more 
information see http://www.motivaenterprises.com. 
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data limitation issue that I have, their joint analysis makes it possible to have robust 
findings that do not depend on a particular assumption about the life spans of the firms. 
I add zeros to our baseline Dataset-1 with 6,322 observations using the following 
imputation schemes. First, I assume that all the firms in our sample exist during the 
whole period of 1986-2010 and choose not to import in years before or after the firm’s 
actual existence. Therefore, I add zero observations to all the firm-countries-years not 
originally present in the baseline Dataset-1. This procedure produces Dataset-2 with 
270,504 observations. I then change zeros into missing values for the years before the US 
firms in our sample imported for the first time. This procedure imputes that the firms did 
not exist before making their first imports and it reduces the number of observations to 
186,949 in our Dataset-3. Finally, to construct Dataset-4, I also change zeros into missing 
values after firms imported for the last time within the period 1986-2010. This implies 
that the lifetime of a firm starts with its first import and ends with its last import. This 
step further reduces the number of observations to 105,994.  
I adopt the standard gravity model for trade to test our hypotheses. In a standard 
model (1), the value of oil imports from country   to the US in year  , denoted by    
   is 
inversely proportional to     , the distance between the US and the other country, and 
proportional to the product of the two countries’ GDPs, denoted by      and   
  : 
 
(1)         
            
        
     
          
  
, 
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where  ,  ,   and   are unknown parameters, and     
   is an error term. Provided    
   is 
strictly positive, I can log-linearize the above equation to obtain the standard gravity 
equation:  
(2)            
                            
       
  , 
where instead of      which typically measures geographic distance as well as cultural 
distance, I include the one year lag of political distance between the US and country  . 
Our coefficient of interest is   and it measures the impact of political distance on the log 
of the value of oil imports by US firms.  Following the conventions from literature on 
trade, other control variables are measured in year  . In our baseline specification I 
control for oil reserves and population.
4
 I also include year fixed effects to capture time-
specific characteristics (e.g., global oil price, US GDP and political distance to the rest of 
the world), and oil exporter fixed effects to capture time-invariant characteristics (e.g., 
geographical distance and cultural distance to the US).   
 Given that equation (2) can only be used to estimate regressions with strictly 
positive no-zaro oil imports, I also use the Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood 
estimator (PPML) proposed by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) to estimate equation (1), 
thus zero oil imports can also be included in the analysis. While the PPML estimates are 
consistent even in the presence of heteroscedasticity, if certain oil imports are incorrectly 
reported as zeros, the PPML estimates may be biased. Thus, I report both OLS and PPML 
estimates.  
 
                                                          
4
 As a robustness check I also tried to control for oil production instead of oil reserves.  
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3.1.  Political distance and US oil imports: panel analysis with fixed effects 
Table 2 presents our basic results. In the first two columns I report the estimates 
of simple fixed effects OLS regressions, where the dependent variable is the logarithm of 
oil imports by US firms in our sample. In column (1) the regressions include exporter’s 
fixed effects and in column (2) year fixed effects are included as well. When both fixed 
effects are included the estimate of the political distance coefficient becomes marginally 
significant and has a negative sign, i.e. greater political distance between the US and oil-
exporting countries leads to US firms importing significantly less oil.  
The rest of Table 2 includes regressions estimated with the Poisson pseudo-
maximum-likelihood (PPML) estimator. The level of oil imports is the dependent 
variable in PPML regressions which allows the inclusion of zero values in the estimation. 
I prefer the PPML specification and employ it to run our baseline regression using the 
datasets that I constructed. The negative and statistically significant coefficient for 
political distance in all of the PPML regressions shows that political distance has a 
negative effect on oil imports.  
I also test whether the results of Table 2 are robust to the oil production control 
variable included instead of oil reserves. In the specifications with oil production (not 
reported in this paper) the negative coefficient for the political distance also prevails, but 
the coefficient is often insignificant, or it has lower levels of significance on several 
occasions. This also affects the estimates of GDP and population variables, causing them 
to become insignificant. I explain this result by endogeneity of the oil production variable.  
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3.2.  Large firms drive the results 
In Table 3 and Table 4 I present the results for the subsamples of large firms to 
test the hypothesis that mainly large, vertically integrated US oil firms react to changes in 
political relationships between the United States and oil exporting countries.
5
  In Table 3 
the firm is large if its average annual oil imports are greater than the average annual 
imports for the whole sample. In Table 4 the firm is large if its total imports are bigger 
than the average total imports for the whole sample. While the two dummy variables 
often coincide, if a firm imports a large quantity of oil but only for a couple of years 
within the overall period, these two dummy variables may serve to put this firm into 
different categories, i.e. large versus small firms.  
As both tables show larger than average firms in our sample appear to drive the 
baseline results. The estimate of the coefficient for political distance is negative and 
significant and also greater in magnitude. The regressions for the subsample of small 
firms defined by using both approaches (the results are not reported) result in 
insignificant estimates for the political distance coefficient. 
 
3.3.  Analysis of Different Subsamples 
Table 5 reports the results specifically for the cold-war period. As expected, the 
effect of political distance on oil imports is more pronounced than that for the period 
1986-2010. The coefficient for political distance is negative, significant and larger in 
                                                          
5
 I am collecting information on overseas investments by the US firms in our sample to directly test the 
hypothesis that the hold-up problem and the risk of expropriation influence import behavior of the US large, 
vertically integrated oil-importing firms. 
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magnitude, thus suggesting that US oil-firms diversified their sources of oil supply away 
from the political opponents of the US more actively during the cold-war period. The 
same pattern re-appears for the period after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 as shown in Table 
6 where I can observe that the negative coefficients for political distance tend to be larger 
and more significant.  
Another way I restrict our sample is by retaining only the countries that have a 
history of oil nationalizations. I take the list of such countries from Guriev et al. (2011). 
Mityakov et al. (2012) show that the effect of political distance on US oil imports is 
higher for the subsample defined as in Guriev (2011). Table 7 reports our results for the 
subsample of countries with a history of oil nationalizations. While the coefficients on 
political distance are similar in magnitude and significance levels to those of the overall 
sample, the regressions for the rest of the subsample of countries that did not nationalize 
(the results are not reported) tend to produce insignificant coefficients on political 
distance.  
 
4. Conclusion 
I confirm the finding of Mityakov et al (2011, 2012) that US firms imports 
significantly less oil from the political opponents of the United States. In our preferred 
Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) specification with fixed effects and 
controlling for oil reserves I find that a one standard deviation reduction in political 
distance increases US oil imports by more than 13 percent. I also find that the negative 
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effect of political distance on oil imports by US firms is more pronounced for the cold-
war period and the post 9/11 terrorist attack period, suggesting that US oil-firms 
diversified their sources of oil supply away from the political opponents of the US most 
openly during these two periods.  
Moreover, it appears that the negative effect of political distance on oil imports by 
US firms is more pronounced for the subsample of large oil-importing firms compared to 
that for the overall sample. Assuming that large US oil firms
6
 are more likely to have 
overseas investments in oil exploration than small US oil firms, large firms tend to be 
more sensitive to the hold-up and expropriation risks imposed by foreign governments. 
Such risks likely rise when the political relationship between the US and oil exporting 
countries worsens, thus leading to lower oil imports to the US. While data on FDI 
matched to the US firms in our sample would help to quantify the economic costs of oil 
dependence, the findings of this study contribute to the growing literature that identifies 
the influence of international politics on trade patterns.  
                                                          
6
 Large firms are identified by either annual quantity of oil imports or, as an alternative, by total quantity of 
oil they have imported.  
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Table 1.: Descriptive Statistics 
     
Variable Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
 Dataset 1: 59 countries (6322 observations, 1986-2008) 
     
US Oil Imports 8294.305 18030.72 0 197479 
Political distance (UNGA 
voting) 
.776 .114 .42 .956 
Log exporter’s oil reserves 2.452 1.974 -5.006 5.587 
Log exporter’s production 6.886 1.364 0 9.164 
Log exporter’s GDP 8.539 1.056 5.226 11.370 
Log exporter’s population 9.880 1.532 5.415 14.091 
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Table 2.: Distances and US Oil Imports: Different imputation schemes 
 FE-
OLS 
FE-
OLS 
FE-
PPML 
FE-
PPML 
 FE-
PPML 
FE-PPML  FE-
PPML 
FE-PPML  FE-
PPML 
FE-
PPML 
Dependent variable       
         
       
       
        
       
        
       
        
       
   
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8)  (9) (10) 
              
 Dataset-1  Dataset-2  Dataset-3  Dataset-4 
              
Political distance   
(UNGA voting) 
0.020 -1.015 -1.072 -1.053  -1.262 -1.174  -1.335 -1.174  -1.006 -1.174 
 (0.02) (-1.61) (-1.93) (-1.42)  (-2.26) (-2.02)  (-2.40) (-2.02)  (-1.76) (-2.02) 
Log exporter’s oil 
reserves 
0.281 0.001 -0.030 -0.025  0.036 0.048  0.052 0.048  0.041 0.048 
 (6.13) (0.02) (-0.95) (-1.39)  (1.51) (1.46)  (1.95) (1.46)  (1.56) (1.46) 
Log exporter’s GDP -0.031 0.185 0.381 -0.126  0.287 0.158  0.115 0.158  0.353 0.158 
 (-0.22) (1.44) (3.36) (-0.79)  (2.46) (0.97)  (0.96) (0.97)  (2.86) (0.97) 
Log exporter’s 
population 
0.034 0.046 0.626 -0.450  0.887 0.029  -0.522 0.029  0.626 0.029 
 (0.37) (0.11) (1.93) (-0.87)  (1.74) (0.04)  (-1.28) (0.04)  (1.20) (0.04) 
Year fixed effects yes yes no yes  no yes  no yes  no yes 
Exporter fixed effects no yes yes yes  yes yes  yes yes  yes yes 
Observations 6,047 6,047 6,058 6,058  183,768 183,768  127,312 127,312  72,010 72,010 
Countries 59 59 54 54  59 59  59 59  59 59 
R2 0.118 0.256            
 
Note: Robust t-values (or z-values for FE-PPML regressions), calculated with standard errors clustered by country 
are in parentheses.  Political distance is included in the regressions with a one-year lag. Dataset-1 refers to the 
original constructed dataset without additional modifications. Dataset-2 refers to the dataset where zero values are 
imputed for all firms-countries-years from Dataset-1. Dataset-3 is a further transformation of Dataset-2, where 
missing values are included instead of zeros for the periods before a firm imported for the first time. Dataset-4 is a 
transformation of Dataset-3, where missing values are also included instead of zeros for the periods after the firm 
imported for the last time. As a robustness check all regressions in this table and the other tables were repeated with 
the log (exporter’s oil production) in place of log (exporter’s oil reserves). While negative coefficient for the 
political distance variable remains in most of the regressions, the coefficient is often insignificant, or has lower 
significance levels in several regressions. I prefer the specification with log (exporter’s oil reserves) because it is 
less likely to be subject to the endogeneity problem.  
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Table 3.: Distances and US Oil Imports: Large firms as measured by average annual imports 
 FE-PPML FE-PPML  FE-PPML FE-PPML  FE-PPML FE-PPML  FE-PPML FE-PPML 
Dependent variable     
       
        
       
        
       
        
       
   
 Dataset-1  Dataset-2  Dataset-3  Dataset-4 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
            
Political distance  
(UNGA voting) 
-1.171 -1.959  -1.429 -1.463  -1.513 -1.004  -0.818 -0.955 
 (-2.25) (-3.10)  (-2.51) (-2.68)  (-2.72) (-1.69)  (-1.45) (-1.47) 
Log exporter’s oil reserves -0.026 -0.008  0.019 0.029  0.032 0.029  0.023 0.043 
 (-0.68) (-0.40)  (0.92) (1.03)  (1.18) (0.83)  (0.89) (1.23) 
Log exporter’s GDP 0.366 -0.195  0.309 0.149  0.216 0.090  0.412 0.078 
 (2.35) (-1.35)  (2.86) (0.89)  (1.99) (0.49)  (3.20) (0.41) 
Log exporter’s population 0.687 -0.147  0.940 -0.009  0.553 -0.049  1.402 -0.012 
 (1.53) (-0.21)  (1.68) (-0.01)  (1.03) (-0.06)  (2.08) (-0.01) 
Year fixed effects no yes  no yes  no yes  no yes 
Exporter fixed effects yes yes  yes yes  yes yes  yes yes 
Observations 3,452 3,452  34,162 34,162  27,399 27,399  21,008 21,008 
Countries 51 51  59 59  58 58  58 58 
 
Note: Robust t-values (or z-values for FE-PPML regressions), calculated with standard errors clustered by country 
are in parentheses.  Political distance is included in the regressions with a one-year lag. Dataset-1 refers to the 
original constructed dataset without additional modifications. Dataset-2 refers to the dataset where zero values are 
imputed for all firms-countries-years from Dataset-1. Dataset-3 is a further transformation of Dataset-2, where 
missing values are included instead of zeros for the periods before a firm imported for the first time. Dataset-4 is a 
transformation of Dataset-3, where missing values are also included instead of zeros for the periods after the firm 
imported for the last time.  
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Table 4.: Distances and US Oil Imports: Large firms as measured by total imports 
 FE-
PPML 
FE-
PPML 
 FE-
PPML 
FE-
PPML 
 FE-
PPML 
FE-
PPML 
 FE-
PPML 
FE-
PPML 
Dependent variable     
       
        
       
        
       
        
       
   
 Dataset-1  Dataset-2  Dataset-3  Dataset-4 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
            
Political distance  
(UNGA voting) 
-1.032 -1.485  -1.429 -1.463  -1.526 -1.463  -0.710 -1.463 
 (-1.54) (-2.09)  (-2.51) (-2.68)  (-2.70) (-2.68)  (-1.27) (-2.68) 
Log exporter’s oil 
reserves 
-0.45 -0.02  0.019 0.029  0.025 0.029  0.002 0.029 
 (-0.83) (-0.61)  (0.92) (1.03)  (1.16) (1.03)  (0.10) (1.03) 
Log exporter’s GDP 0.354 -0.165  0.309 0.149  0.274 0.149  0.469 0.149 
 (1.99) (-0.92)  (2.86) (0.89)  (2.60) (0.89)  (3.83) (0.89) 
Log exporter’s 
population 
0.896 -0.207  0.940 -0.009  0.499 -0.009  1.296 -0.009 
 (2.07) (-0.24)  (1.68) (-0.01)  (0.96) (-0.01)  (1.98) (-0.01) 
Year fixed effects no yes  no yes  no yes  no yes 
Exporter fixed effects yes yes  yes yes  yes yes  yes yes 
Observations 2,648 2,648  34,162 34,162  31,343 31,343  26,756 26,756 
Countries 50 50  59 59  59 59  59 59 
 
Note: Robust t-values (or z-values for FE-PPML regressions), calculated with standard errors clustered by country 
are in parentheses.  Political distance is included in the regressions with a one-year lag. Dataset-1 refers to the 
original constructed dataset without additional modifications. Dataset-2 refers to the dataset where zero values are 
imputed for all firms-countries-years from Dataset-1. Dataset-3 is a further transformation of Dataset-2, where 
missing values are included instead of zeros for the periods before a firm imported for the first time. Dataset-4 is a 
transformation of Dataset-3, where missing values are also included instead of zeros for the periods after the firm 
imported for the last time.  
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Table 5.: Distances and US Oil Imports: Cold-war period (1986-1989) 
 FE-
PPML 
FE-
PPML 
 FE-
PPML 
FE-
PPML 
 FE-
PPML 
FE-
PPML 
 FE-
PPML 
FE-
PPML 
Dependent variable     
       
        
       
        
       
        
       
   
 Dataset-1  Dataset-2  Dataset-3  Dataset-4 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
            
Political distance   
(UNGA voting) 
-4.608 -4.681  -5.298 -5.478  -6.152 -5.478  -5.322 -5.478 
 (-1.96) (-2.04)  (-4.92) (-3.03)  (-1.45) (-3.03)  (-2.08) (-3.01) 
Log exporter’s oil 
reserves 
-0.059 -0.043  -0.043 -0.037  -0.067 -0.037  -0.030 -0.037 
 (-0.37) (-0.27)  (-0.62) (-0.36)  (-0.24) (-0.36)  (-0.44) (-0.33) 
Log exporter’s GDP 0.713 0.657  0.829 0.774  0.718 0.774  0.788 0.774 
 (2.54) (2.36)  (6.70) (6.51)  (2.41) (6.51)  (6.11) (6.51) 
Log exporter’s 
population 
5.941 5.354  9.331 8.814  7.952 8.814  9.021 8.814 
 (2.67) (1.84)  (6.74) (2.19)  (1.76) (2.16)  (3.66) (2.16) 
Year fixed effects no Yes  no yes  no yes  no yes 
Exporter fixed effects yes Yes  yes yes  yes yes  yes yes 
Observations 825 825  16,536 16,536  7,496 7,496  6,220 6,220 
Countries 34 34  36 36  36 36  36 36 
 
Note: Robust t-values (or z-values for FE-PPML regressions), calculated with standard errors clustered by country 
are in parentheses.  Political distance is included in the regressions with a one-year lag. Dataset-1 refers to the 
original constructed dataset without additional modifications. Dataset-2 refers to the dataset where zero values are 
imputed for all firms-countries-years from Dataset-1. Dataset-3 is a further transformation of Dataset-2, where 
missing values are included instead of zeros for the periods before a firm imported for the first time. Dataset-4 is a 
transformation of Dataset-3, where missing values are also included instead of zeros for the periods after the firm 
imported for the last time.  
18 
 
Table 6.: Distances and US Oil Imports: Post 9/11 period (2001-2008) 
 FE-
PPML 
FE-
PPML 
 FE-
PPML 
FE-
PPML 
 FE-
PPML 
FE-
PPML 
 FE-
PPML 
FE-
PPML 
Dependent variable     
       
        
       
        
       
        
       
   
 Dataset-1  Dataset-2  Dataset-3  Dataset-4 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
            
Political distance   
(UNGA voting) 
-2.223 -0.045  -1.983 0.083  -2.011 0.083  -1.328 0.083 
 (-2.64) (-0.06)  (-2.31) (0.09)  (-2.39) (0.09)  (-1.51) (0.09) 
Log exporter’s oil 
reserves 
-1.132 -0.001  1.171 0.230  0.193 0.230  0.118 0.230 
 (-1.18) (-0.02)  (1.27) (1.73)  (1.44) (1.73)  (0.90) (1.73) 
Log exporter’s GDP 0.475 -0.182  0.464 0.034  0.376 0.034  0.393 0.034 
 (2.35) (-1.03)  (1.90) (0.15)  (1.56) (0.15)  (1.60) (0.15) 
Log exporter’s 
population 
3.201 -0.192  -0.226 -1.055  -0.891 -1.055  1.576 -1.055 
 (2.46) (-0.07)  (-0.13) (-0.36)  (-0.52) (-0.36)  (0.94) (-0.36) 
Year fixed effects no yes  no yes  no yes  no yes 
Exporter fixed effects yes yes  yes yes  yes yes  yes yes 
Observations 2,365 2,365  59,748 59,748  53,016 53,016  23,868 23,868 
Countries 48 48  50 50  50 50  50 50 
 
Note: Robust t-values (or z-values for FE-PPML regressions), calculated with standard errors clustered by country 
are in parentheses.  Political distance is included in the regressions with a one-year lag. Dataset-1 refers to the 
original constructed dataset without additional modifications. Dataset-2 refers to the dataset where zero values are 
imputed for all firms-countries-years from Dataset-1. Dataset-3 is a further transformation of Dataset-2, where 
missing values are included instead of zeros for the periods before a firm imported for the first time. Dataset-4 is a 
transformation of Dataset-3, where missing values are also included instead of zeros for the periods after the firm 
imported for the last time.  
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Table 7.: Distances and US Oil Imports: Oil nationalization subsample 
 FE-
PPML 
FE-
PPML 
 FE-
PPML 
FE-
PPML 
 FE-
PPML 
FE-
PPML 
 FE-
PPML 
FE-
PPML 
Dependent variable     
       
        
       
        
       
        
       
   
 Dataset-1  Dataset-2  Dataset-3  Dataset-4 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
            
Political distance   
(UNGA voting) 
-0.735 -0.659  -0.873 -1.029  -1.063 -1.029  -0.636 -1.029 
 (-1.16) (-0.95)  (-1.36) (-1.69)  (-1.61) (-1.69)  (-0.95) (-1.69) 
Log exporter’s oil 
reserves 
-0.003 -0.017  0.055 0.055  0.053 0.55  0.060 0.055 
 (-0.13) (-0.78)  (1.97) (1.19)  (1.66) (1.19)  (1,93) (1.19) 
Log exporter’s GDP 0.332 -0.118  0.198 -0.012  0.059 -0.012  0.272 -0.012 
 (3.12) (-0.65)  (1.75) (-0.07)  (0.53) (-0.07)  (2.20) (-0.07) 
Log exporter’s 
population 
0.552 -0.336  0.919 -0.162  -0.454 -0.162  0.653 -0.162 
 (1.80) (-0.51)  (1.85) (-0.18)  (-1.16) (-0.18)  (1.28) (-0.18) 
Year fixed effects no Yes  no Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
Exporter fixed effects yes Yes  yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 4439 4439  92664 92664  63608 63608  36267 36267 
Countries 27 27  28 28  28 28  28 28 
 
Note: Robust t-values (or z-values for FE-PPML regressions), calculated with standard errors clustered by country 
are in parentheses.  Political distance is included in the regressions with a one-year lag. Dataset-1 refers to the 
original constructed dataset without additional modifications. Dataset-2 refers to the dataset where zero values are 
imputed for all firms-countries-years from Dataset-1. Dataset-3 is a further transformation of Dataset-2, where 
missing values are included instead of zeros for the periods before a firm imported for the first time. Dataset-4 is a 
transformation of Dataset-3, where missing values are also included instead of zeros for the periods after the firm 
imported for the last time.  
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Appendix A: Details on the essay “Political limits on the World 
Oil Trade: Firm-level Evidence from US firms” 
 
A. 1. Sample of oil exporting countries (59 countries) 
Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Belize, Brunei, Belarus, 
Cameroon, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo (Republic of), Congo (Dem. Rep.), Benin, 
Denmark, Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Georgia, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, 
Cote d`Ivoire, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Libya, Malaysia, Mauritania, Mexico, Oman, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, 
Russia, Saudi Arabia, Vietnam, South Africa, Spain, Syria, Thailand, Trinidad &Tobago, United 
Arab Emirates, Tunisia, Turkey, Egypt, Venezuela, Yemen.  
 
 
